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Deceptive intentions

AI-propaganda use and reach in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election

Bibliographic Data

ID22423441
AuthorsAlexander Tiberghien (Department of Cyber and Computer Sciences, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, USA), Jonah Dalton (Department of Cyber and Computer Sciences, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, USA), William Mclean (Department of Cyber and Computer Sciences, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, USA), Deepti Joshi (0000-0003-3274-5907, Department of Cyber and Computer Sciences, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, USA), Jordana Navarro (0000-0001-6395-5136, Department of Cyber and Computer Sciences, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, USA, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume28
Issue2
Pages171-182
Publication date2026-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of Police Science & Management (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1461-3557 • E-ISSN: 1478-1603
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/14613557261447753
OpenAlexW7164910432
LanguageEN
References cited16

The proliferation of artificially generated images has introduced a new class of visual propaganda referred to as deepfakes, which can deceptively mimic reality and manipulate perception on a massive scale. Although propaganda is hardly a new social problem, the emergence of deepfakes necessitates an interdisciplinary response from the social sciences as well as cyber/computer sciences. In this study, the research team revisited long recognized propaganda categories to determine which types were most impactful across X.com with a focus on the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. Working from a data set of 202 politically charged deepfakes, images were classified across 17 classic propaganda techniques (e.g., bandwagon, fear, transfer) and a propaganda impact score was introduced to quantify impact, which was a composite metric integrating reach, sentiment, and toxicity. The results of this study show that the propaganda categories of preemptive framing, deification, and bandwagon disproportionately shaped engagement and emotional response. Put differently, the results of this study showed that the most virally effective images are not necessarily the most toxic, but rather those that strategically pair emotional resonance with algorithmically optimized reach. Thus, a key takeaway from this study for cybersecurity and security professionals who are charged with combating disinformation in various spaces is that particular types of propaganda are more effective and dangerous to eliciting emotional responses relative to others.

Bandwagon effect · Disinformation · Perception · Presidential election · Presidential system · Social media · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Public Relations and Crisis Communication

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  • Who inadvertently shares deepfakes? Analyzing the role of political interest, cognitive ability, and social network size

    Open Access•Saifuddin Ahmed•Telematics and Informatics•2021

  • Deepfakes on Twitter

    Open Access•Jesús Ángel Pérez Dasilva, Koldobika Meso Ayerdi et al.•Media and Communication•2021

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    Open Access•Don Fallis•Philosophy & Technology•2021

  • Do (Microtargeted) Deepfakes Have Real Effects on Political Attitudes

    Open Access•Tom Dobber, Nadia Metoui et al.•The International Journal of…•2020

  • Deepfakes as a Democratic Threat

    Open Access•Viorela Dan•The International Journal of…•2025

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    Open Access•Teresa Weikmann, Hannah Greber et al.•The International Journal of…•2024

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  • Deepfakes and Disinformation

    Open Access•C Vaccari, Andrew Chadwick•Social Media + Society•2020

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