A Neo-Pragmatist Account of Normativity

Bibliographic Data

ID22430794
AuthorsHenrik Sova (0000-0002-1591-0889, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume18
Issue1
Publication date2026-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2036-4091 • E-ISSN: 2036-4091
PublisherOpenEdition (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.4000/16kmh
OpenAlexW7168316186
LanguageEN
References cited18

This article develops a two-step neo-pragmatist account of normativity that explains (1) what we are doing when we use normative concepts and (2) how such practices emerged. I suggest that we use normative concepts (like “should”) to express and endorse inferences in practical reasoning – reasoning that tells us what to do. These inferences are not logical entailments between propositions, but rather material inferences that commit us to certain actions. The second step is to give a natural, evolutionary story of how such a practice could emerge. I argue that a crucial development occurs when agents begin to recognize exceptions to earlier commitments. This change allows entitlement relations to emerge in addition to commitments. The emergence of both entitlements and commitments enables these social practices to develop in such a way that a structure of material inferences takes shape, thereby making the practice normative.

Commit · Defeasible estate · Defeasible reasoning · Normative · Philosophy of science · Social practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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