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Neoliberal ideology or rent seeking? What explains World Bank financing decisions?

Bibliographic Data

ID22434953
AuthorsBrian Meehan (0000-0002-6992-5787, Berry College, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume41
Issue1
Pages102-118
Publication date2026-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Public Finance and Public Choice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2515-6918 • E-ISSN: 2515-6926
PublisherBristol University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1332/25156918y2025d000000027
OpenAlexW4411334851
LanguageEN
References cited11

Financing decisions made by the World Bank are frequently criticized for their perceived alignment with the principles of the “Washington Consensus” or “neoliberal” free-market ideology. Critics argue that the conditions imposed by these institutions as prerequisites for funding reflect a commitment to this ideological framework. This article seeks to quantify the extent to which market reforms in the style of the Washington Consensus or neoliberalism serve as predictors of World Bank funding decisions. To examine this relationship, I utilize data from Malik and Stone regarding World Bank loan disbursements. The article focuses on whether changes in economic freedom before the closing of World Bank funding projects generate more complete loan disbursements. My chosen metric for measuring neoliberal reforms is the Economic Freedom of the World Index. Results of this analysis are compared with the original findings of Malik and Stone, which emphasize the significant role played by corporate interest lobbying and rent-seeking behavior in securing World Bank financing. The outcome of this study provides limited support for the rent-seeking narrative proposed by Malik and Stone, but it does not substantiate the notion that financing decisions hinge on neoliberal institutional changes.

Business · Economics · Financial system · Ideology · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Rent-seeking · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Economic Theory and Policy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Finance

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Highly citedNo

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