In Defense of Unrealistic Assumptions

Bibliographic Data

ID2247244
AuthorsKanazawa (0000-0003-3786-8797, Cornell University, corresponding author), Satoshi Kanazawa
Year1998
Volume16
Issue2
Pages193-204
Publication date1998-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSociological Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0735-2751 • E-ISSN: 1467-9558
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/0735-2751.00050
OpenAlexW2070279139
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited41

I argue that a theory's assumptions always are and ought to be unrealistic. Further, we should attempt to make them more unrealistic in order to increase a theory's fruitfulness. Many sociologists believe that a theory's assumptions ought to be empirically realistic. I contend that this criticism probably stems from the confusion of a theory's assumptions with its scope conditions. While Friedman's (1953) similar prescription is associated with the instrumentalist philosophy of science, I maintain that it is also consistent with the realist view if 'unrealistic' is taken to mean 'incomplete' rather than 'untrue.' I discuss a recent theory of the value of children by Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) to point out how assumptions differ from scope conditions and how empirically plausible and realistic hypotheses can be logically deduced from highly unrealistic assumptions. I then discuss Kollock's (1993a, 1993b) revision of Axelrod's (1984) Cooperation Theory as an example of when assumptions need to be revised

Confusion · Criticism · Economics · Epistemology · Generality · Instrumentalism · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology

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