The continuous and discontinuous person: two dimensions of ethical life
Dados Bibliográficos
| AUTOR(ES) | |
|---|---|
| AFILIAÇÃO(ÕES) | University of Toronto Faculty of Medicine |
| ANO | 2013 |
| TIPO | Artigo |
| PERIÓDICO | Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute |
| ISSN | 1359-0987 |
| E-ISSN | 1467-9655 |
| EDITORA | Sage Publications (United States) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9655.12073 |
| CITAÇÕES | 15 |
| ADICIONADO EM | 2025-08-18 |
| MD5 |
e1b2b7762433d44ef31936128fcb5e92
|
Resumo
Whereas early liberal thinkers developed the concept of the ethically accountable continuous forensic modernEuropean person in contrast to what they saw as the discontinuous and hence unaccountable mimetic person, I argue that forensic and mimetic are better understood both as ideologies of personhood and as dimensions of all persons rather than as fully distinctive kinds of persons. I present an account of persons as accountable for their acts but show that this is not limited to the maximally continuous and autonomous person of liberal ideology. I review other forms of personhood encountered cross‐culturally and suggest that the mimetic dimension offsets some of the problems inherent in an exclusively forensic model.