A Critical Commentary on the Taktika of Leo VI, by John Haldon

Very few states have been as militarised as was Byzantium in the early Middle Ages. Faced by all manner of adversaries on land and sea—the most formidable being the new world empire of Islam—the institutions of government and the whole social order were geared to the waging of defensive war. Three of the greatest achievements of this beleaguered rump of the Roman empire in the Middle East were, firstly, its ideological recovery, in the later 650s, from shock, paralysing shock, at the initial outrush of Arab forces; secondly, the development of a powerful strategic navy; and, thirdly, the devising of a guerrilla strategy of defence to which notables, townsmen, and both richer and poorer villagers committed themselves. The costs (economic and cultural) were high, but ultimate success was almost within sight in 886 when Leo VI, second son of the usurper Basil I, came to the throne. Basil, a man who combined the arts and wiles of the courtier with the acumen and boldness of a great commander, did not have a high opinion of Leo—bookish, devout and principal sponsor of a programme of legal renovation which culminated in the production of the Basilica , a massive compendium of Roman law. As emperor, Leo stayed well away from all theatres of war, preferring the pulpit to military command in the field.

Byzantine Studies and History · History · Medieval Literature and History · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy