Comment on “The Structure of a Scientific Paper” by Frederick Suppe

Bibliographic Data

ID22754791
AuthorsAllan Franklin (University of Colorado Boulder, corresponding author), Colin Howson (London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume65
Issue3
Pages411-416
Publication date1998-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/392653
OpenAlexW2033120789
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited10

On the basis of an analysis of a single paper on plate tectonics, a paper whose actual content is nowhere in evidence, Frederick Suppe concludes that no standard model of confirmation—hypothetico-deductive, Bayesian-inductive, or inference to the best explanation—can account for the structure of a scientific paper that reports an experimental result. He further argues on the basis of a survey of scientific papers, a survey whose data and results are also absent, that papers which have a rather stringent length limit, such as the one on plate tectonics, are typical of science. Thus, he concludes that no standard confirmation scheme is capable of dealing with scientific practice. Suppe also requires that an adequate model of philosophical testing should be able to account for everything in such scientific papers, in which space is at a premium.

Basis (linear algebra) · Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Inference · Limit (mathematics) · Mathematical economics · Philosophy of science · Scientific method · Scientific theory · Space (punctuation) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Probability and Statistical Research · Quantum Mechanics and Applications

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