Moral Panics, The Military-Industrial Complex, and The Arms Race

Bibliographic Data

ID2276541
AuthorsSheldon Ungar (University of Toronto, corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume31
Issue2
Pages165-185
Publication date1990-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSociological Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-0253 • E-ISSN: 1533-8525
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1533-8525.1990.tb00323.x
OpenAlexW2049765029
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited34

This study argues that the generalized fear of the Soviet threat was punctuated by moral panics that provided a signal impetus to the arms race. The growth of the American nuclear arsenal came in three large waves (the Truman. the Eisenhower/Kennedy/McNamara, and the Reagan buildups), the result of panics unleashed by startling and spectacular Soviet challenges to American nuclear hegemony (the Soviet atomic bomb, the Sputnik/Cuban missile crisis, and the window of vulnerability, respectively). The initial panics were instrumental in overcoming the fiscal constraints imposed on the military by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, creating conditions conducive to the ascendency of a military-industrial complex. More specifically, the timing of the panics was determined by authentic surges of fear that in turn provided the political leverage for large-scale nuclear buildups. The direction taken by the panics, however, was determined by the creation and dramatization of an elective affinity between nuclear supremacy and both national security and the sanctity of the American way of life. In contrast with these panics, most efforts to mobilize fear by creating the perception of gaps in the Soviet favor failed

Arms race · Criminology · Dramatization · Hegemony · Moral panic · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Crime, Deviance, and Social Control · Law · Rhetoric and Communication Studies · Risk Perception and Management

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