In Defense of Radical Constructionism

Bibliographic Data

ID2277419
AuthorsDarin Weinberg (0000-0002-5952-9991, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume53
Issue3
Pages360-373
Publication date2012-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSociological Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-0253 • E-ISSN: 1533-8525
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1533-8525.2012.01243.x
OpenAlexW1487150377
LanguageEN
References cited33

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size NOTESNotes1 The essay that is the focus of this symposium builds on arguments made in two earlier published articles (CitationHo 2008a,Citationb). Hence, in what follows, I will draw not only from his remarks in the present essay but from remarks made in those earlier essays as well.2 Supporting quotes can be found in abundance throughout Schutz's oeuvre but three will here suffice, "it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitutes reality" (CitationSchutz 1967c:230). Second, "[a]ll our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs. ... Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple" (CitationSchutz 1967a:5). And finally, "[b]y the term 'social reality' I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men" (CitationSchutz 1967b:53).3 While Ho does seem to understand that people's tacit background expectancies can only be observed empirically when they are somehow reflected in manifest conduct, he does not seem to understand that their content, sociocultural scope, and specific influence are most clearly empirically identified in social interaction. Even after they have found their way into someone's manifest conduct, the identity of the specific background expectancies indicated remain empirically indeterminate until others on the scene have manifestly responded to the conduct, and thereby made its meaning a collective possession, or in ethnomethdological parlance, locally accountable (cf. CitationHeritage 1984). It is for this epistemological reason that Gubrium, Holstein, and a long list of other ethnomethodologically informed social scientists attend to the details of manifest interaction, usually discursive interaction, for empirical clues as to the identity and scope of people's background expectancies rather than seek to attend more directly to the putatively shared, but empirically unavailable, contents of people's minds.4 This insight was grasped by Garfinkel, Sacks, and other ethnomethodologists from the beginning and has only been further developed over time, particularly but not exclusively through the ethnomethodologically informed project of conversation analysis. In light of their enduring and extensive interest in language use, I found Ho's claim (p. 336, notes 2 and 3) that ethnomethodologists have had only a limited interest in linguistic activity completely baffling.5 Of considerable significance to the present discussion, CitationMike Lynch (1993:142) writes in this regard: "The policy of [ethnomethodological] indifference not only applies to questions about the 'ultimate' validity and reliability of sociologists' descriptions, explanations, and measurements; it also covers Schutz's normative proposals concerning the 'special' character of scientific cognition, including his theoretical contrast between the natural and social sciences. Since indifference is not equivalent to denial or opposition, the policy does not imply that social scientists' methods have a 'merely' commonsense basis. What other kind of basis could they have? Nor does it imply that there are no distinctions to be drawn among sociologists,' coroners,' physicists,' or any other lay or professional methods. Rather, it states that any such distinction is contingent, locally organized, and in a peculiar way discoverable."Not much ethnomethodological support here for Ho's claim that some set of descriptions, explanations, or measurements might reveal structures that are intrinsically and universally more primordial than any other. 6 The two citations held to support this claim are CitationPsathas (2004:17) and CitationGarfinkel and Livingston (2004:26–27). The Psathas citation depicts correspondence between Garfinkel and Schutz in 1953, wherein Garfinkel indicates his inspiration for an article entitled "Notes on the Sociological Attitude" was Schutz's distinction between the natural and scientific attitudes. Very tellingly, however, it also describes Schutz's concession that "the methodological decisions upon which the actual practices of sociologists are based is practically unknown territory," and his hope that Garfinkel would be "one of the explorers of this undiscovered treasure island." Clearly, then, Schutz was not himself confident he understood the difference between actual sociological reasoning and actual commonsense reasoning. More tellingly still, it notes that Garfinkel eventually replaced his reference in this paper to the "actual practices of sociologists" with a reference to the "methodologies of actual practices by ordinary members of society," suggesting a rather dramatic closure of the distance Garfinkel sought to draw between sociological and commonsense reasoning. The Garfinkel and Livingston citation makes no mention of either Schutz or the distinction between common sense and science but notes only the importance of genuine observation over textual accounts of ethnomethodology's phenomena. In short, it provides no support for Ho's claim that Garfinkel endorsed an "ontological break" between common sense and science.7 A similar argument was famously made by the distinguished philosopher CitationWillard Van Orman Quine (1951). Much like Garfinkel, Quine argued that science is not based either on a foundation of enduring logical truths or sense data but of commonsense cultural assumptions, all of which are potentially subject to revision

Constructionism · Epistemology · Sociology · Strict constructionism · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Philosophy · Political theory and Gramsci · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology

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