On Scope Relations between Quantifiers and Epistemic Modals

Dados Bibliográficos

ID22882000
AutoresEarl Swanson (0000-0003-1337-4047, University of Michigan, autor correspondente)
Ano2010
Volume27
Fascículo4
Páginas529-540
Data de publicação2010-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Semantics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0167-5133 • E-ISSN: 1477-4593
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jos/ffq010
OpenAlexW2007422360
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas14

This article presents and discusses a range of counterexamples to the common view that quantifiers cannot take scope over epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for ‘force modifier’ theories of epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for Robert Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals, according to which a special kind of epistemic modal must be able to scope over a whole counterfactual. Finally, some of the counterexamples suggest that David Lewis must countenance ‘would’ counterfactuals in which a covert ‘would’ scopes over the whole consequent of the counterfactual, including an overt ‘might’.

Counterexample · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Covert · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Modal verb · Philosophy of language · Programming language · Scope (computer science) · Verb · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation