Pragmatist Instrumentalism as a Paradigm of Intercultural Legal Semiotics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23027883 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Annette Langner-Pitschmann (0000-0003-4470-3878, Goethe University Frankfurt, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 183-205 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2047-0770 • E-ISSN: 2047-0789 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ojlr/rwae029 |
| OpenAlex | W4404588685 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
The project of intercultural legal semiotics faces the dilemma between the situational character of legal meaning and its cross-situational claim to validity. This article examines the extent to which John Dewey’s conception of cultural naturalism can contribute to further exploration of this inherent conflict. Guided by the assumption that the question of the intercultural comprehensibility of legal meanings refers to the linguistic paradigm of the pragmatic turn, it sets out with a look at Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Against this backdrop, Dewey’s concepts of inquiry and imagination are discussed, revealing their potential for the project of cross-cultural production of legal meaning. In light of Dewey’s theory of religion, in which the implications of these concepts are condensed, this potential is examined more closely. It becomes apparent that Dewey’s deep trust in the human ability to interpret experience appropriately and meaningfully is a crucial prerequisite for a sustainable perspective on the challenge of an intercultural semiotics of law.
Epistemology · Instrumentalism · Meaning (existential) · Pragmatism · Semiotics · Situational ethics · Sociology · Comparative and International Law Studies · Law in Society and Culture · Legal Language and Interpretation · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |