Redrafting imperfect legislation

Structural judgments and judicial supervision of administrative enforcement in Latin America

Bibliographic Data

ID23030286
AuthorsCristián Villalonga Torrijo (0000-0001-5018-861X, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume14
Issue6
Pages1792-1819
Publication date2024-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueOñati Socio-legal Series (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2079-5971 • E-ISSN: 2079-5971
PublisherOnati International Institute for the Sociology of Law (PUBLISHER • ES)
DOI10.35295/osls.iisl/1909
OpenAlexW4404888909
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited33

Structural judgments regarding socioeconomic rights and the judicial oversight of their enforcement are two phenomena that have recently characterized Latin American public law. This paper examines how these phenomena of judicial behaviour respond to certain deficiencies in legislation (e.g., incomplete law and legislative stalemate). Suboptimal legislation usually indicates that political actors cannot impose their preferences or reach satisfactory agreements due to high transaction costs, thus presenting an opportunity for judicial intervention. However, the same suboptimal legislation can also expose a degree of political reluctance or lack of state institutional capacity to implement appropriate policies. Without aiming to establish a comprehensive theory, this paper explores how structural judgments and the creation of judicial monitoring systems deal with these different aspects of imperfect legislation. The paper briefly provides an analytical framework and takes a new approach to examining three well-known case studies from Colombia, Argentina, and Peru.

Business · Imperfect · Legislation · Linguistics · Political science · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal Issues in South Africa · Philosophy

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