Gorgias and the Socratic Principle Nemo Sua Sponte Peccat
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23130622 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Guido Calogero (European University of Rome, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1957 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 12-17 |
| Publication date | 1957-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Hellenic Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0075-4269 • E-ISSN: 2041-4099 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/628627 |
| OpenAlex | W2320491641 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 5 |
More than a century ago the great German scholar Welcker tried to confirm the tradition that amongst the sophists the real master of Socrates had been Prodicus. Welcker called him his ‘forerunner’. In our century this valuation was once exaggerated to the extent of maintaining that the ‘principle of Prodicus’—that is, the care for the exact distinction and usage of the meanings of synonyms—had been the starting-point for every sound development in logic, whereas the methodical pattern presupposed by Socrates in his discussions was, on the contrary, a Prinzip der absoluten Vieldeutigkeit , a principle of absolute equivocation and ambiguity, and therefore the starting-point for every kind of trouble in that field. Of course, the connection of Socrates with Prodicus was justified by the fact that both, in their conversations, appeared frequently to be dissatisfied with certain answers or expressions of their interlocutors, and therefore discussed the meanings of certain terms used by them. But the difference between the two approaches was very sharp, as appears from every passage of the Socratic dialogues of Plato, in which Prodicus is introduced to explain the demands of his synonymies in the midst of the debate. He wants everybody to use, for example, the verb εὐφραίνεσθαι in some cases and the verb ἥδεσθαι in some others, following what he thinks to be the right usage, the ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων ; whereas Socrates does not care what kind of words one may use, but is only interested in what one really expresses by these words, that is, the meaning which he gives to them. Both search for meanings of words: but Prodicus' question is: What does it mean?—and Socrates' question is: What do you mean?—Prodicus says: ἀνδρεία means this, θρασύτης means that: so you shall use ἀνδρεία in the first case and θρασύτης in the second. Socrates asks: What do you mean by ἀνδρεία? ( τί λέγεις τὴν ἀνδρείαν ;).
Ambiguity · Art · Epistemology · Equivocation · Intentionality · Linguistics · Literature · Meaning (existential) · SOCRATES · Socratic method · Verb · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Linguistics and language evolution · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.09 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1982 - 2023 (42) |
| Highly cited | No |