The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference

The Case of Isaiah Berlin

Bibliographic Data

ID23136465
AuthorsPhilip Pettit (0000-0002-0355-3896, Australian National University, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume121
Issue4
Pages693-716
Publication date2011-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/660694
OpenAlexW2041369997
LanguageEN
Citations received57
References cited15

In Hobbes, freedom of choice requires nonfrustration: the option you prefer must be accessible. In Berlin, it requires noninterference: every option, preferred or unpreferred, must be accessible—every door must be open. But Berlin’s argument against Hobbes suggests a parallel argument that freedom requires something stronger still: that each option be accessible and that no one have the power to block access; the doors should be open, and there should be no powerful doorkeepers. This is freedom as nondomination. The claim is that freedom as noninterference is an unstable alternative between freedom as nonfrustration and freedom as nondomination.

Argument (complex analysis) · Doors · Economics · Equating · Frustration · Human rights · Impunity · Law and economics · Political science · Position (finance) · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification