Chrysippus and Plato on the fragility of the head

© Cambridge University Press 2013. Introduction The Stoic interest in Plato’s Timaeus is well established. Both the Stoics and Plato have a shared concern with the connection between physics and theology and, more specifically, both present the physical cosmos as the work of a rational and provident god. There are, of course, significant differences between Stoic and Platonic cosmology. For example, the immanence of the Stoic god as a material principle in the physical cosmos can be contrasted with the more detached status of Plato’s Demiurge. Notwithstanding such differences, the points of similarity between these two world views are striking and informative, not least with regard to their shared insistence on the rationality of the cosmic order and the ethical implications of that rationality. This chapter discusses one point where Stoics engage unmistakably with the Timaeus, and is focused on a problem raised by their common assertion of a providential cosmos: how to explain the existence of evils in a world created by a benevolent god. At Attic Nights 7.1.1-13, Aulus Gellius records Chrysippus’ attempt to defend Stoic cosmology against the objection that ‘if there were providence, there would be no evils’ (si esset providentia, nulla essent mala). The defence comes in two parts, both of them, so Gellius tells us, taken from the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On providence. The first part presents an assertion of the epistemic and ontological interdependence of good and evil: adversus ea Chrysippus cum in libro ?e?? p?????a? quarto dissereret: ‘nihil est prorsus istis’ inquit ‘insubidius, qui opinantur bona esse potuisse si non essent ibidem mala. nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter sese et quasi mutuo adverso quaeque fulta nisu consistere; nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. quo enim pacto iustitiae sensus esse posset, nisi essent iniuriae? aut quid aliud iustitia est quam iniustitiae privatio? quid item fortitudo intellegi posset nisi ex ignaviae adpositione? quid continentia nisi ex intemperantiae? quo item modo prudentia esset, nisi foret contra inprudentia? proinde’ inquit ‘homines stulti cur non hoc etiam desiderant, ut veritas sit et non sit mendacium? namque itidem sunt bona et mala, felicitas et infortunitas, dolor et voluptas; alterum enim ex altero, sicuti Plato ait, verticibus inter se contrariis deligatum est; si tuleris unum, abstuleris utrumque.’

Fragility · Head (geology) · Physics · Thermodynamics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Geology · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · History · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Paleontology · Philosophy · Psychology

• Leibniz and the Stoics

  David Forman•Routledge Handbook of the Stoic…•2016

  Add to list

• Achieving Tranquility

  Tim O’Keefe•Oxford Handbook of Hellenistic…•2025

  Add to list

• Stoic Theology and Providentialism

  Nathan Powers•Oxford Handbook of Hellenistic…•2025

  Add to list