What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties?
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23153154 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Katharina Nieswandt (0000-0003-1663-0667, Concordia University, Montreal, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 97 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 15-28 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2018.1425306 |
| OpenAlex | W2790963318 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 14 |
A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individual rights and duties. The reason why I must not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants in that practice. Common targets of this objection include the theories of Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. I argue that (1) the conventionalism of these theories is superficial; (2) genuinely conventionalist theories are not vulnerable to the objection; and (3) genuine moral conventionalism is independently plausible.
Conventionalism · Epistemology · Political science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification
Morality and Socially Constructed Norms
Constructing Moral Equality
“When in Rome…”
Against the newer evidentialists
The Practice Account of Political Authority
Aesthetic practices and normativity
Do Socially Constructed Norms have Moral Force? Précis to a Symposium
Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View
Response to My Critics
The Game of Belief
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,67 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |