Nietzsche's Intentions
What the Sovereign Individual Promises
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23159231 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron Ridley (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Pages | 181-196 |
| Publication date | 2009-05-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Nietzsche on freedom and autonomy (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231560.003.0009 |
| OpenAlex | W1910174687 |
| ISBN | 9780199231560 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
This chapter argues that there are two distinctive features to the sovereign individual's promise-making. First, that he refuses to hedge his promises about with get-out clauses. Second, that the most characteristic content of his promises are intentions whose success-conditions cannot be specified independently, that cannot, that is, be codified as a set of instructions for successfully executing those intentions. The first feature explains the sovereign individual's ‘mastery’ over ‘circumstances’, ‘nature’, and ‘fate’. The second feature explains why the sovereign individual's kind of ‘autonomy’ makes him ‘supramoral’, that is, ‘autonomy’ and ‘morality’ are said by Nietzsche to be ‘mutually exclusive’.
Autonomy · Epistemology · Feature (linguistics) · Hedge · Law and economics · Linguistics · Morality · Political science · Politics · Set (abstract data type) · Sociology · Sovereignty · Computer Science · Law · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2010 - 2021 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |