Autonomy and the Social Self

Bibliographic Data

ID23160073
AuthorsLinda Barclay (0000-0002-3315-8467, corresponding author)
Year2000
Pages52-71
Publication date2000-01-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueRelational autonomy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressNew York, NY (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/oso/9780195123333.003.0003
OpenAlexW315417651
ISBN9780195123333
LanguageEN
Citations received39

Widespread dissatisfaction with the ideal of individual autonomy is a prominent feature of feminist and communitarian perspectives on moral and political theory. Whether attention is focused on moral impartialism, Kantian ethics, modern political theory, or in particular, contemporary liberalism, a frequently voiced concern is that individual autonomy is overemphasized and that an “atomistic” or “abstract individualistic” conception of the self is presupposed. Both feminists and communitarians have claimed that numerous moral and political theories promote a vision of the autonomous self as essentially independent and self-sufficient, a vision that denies the inescapable connectedness of selves and the fact that their immersion in networks of relationships forms their desires, aspirations, indeed their very identities. In other words, what is denied is that the self is essentially social.

Autonomy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Individualism · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Self · Social connectedness · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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