Legal obligation and authority

Bibliographic Data

ID23160489
AuthorsW Bradley Wendel (0000-0001-9394-0891, Cornell University, corresponding author)
Year2014
Pages89-105
Publication date2014-10-06
Open AccessYes
TypeCHAPTER
VenueEthics and Law (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/cbo9781107337114.007
OpenAlexW2287953841
ISBN9781107337114
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited13

This chapter moves from conceptual questions about the nature of law to moral questions about the relationship between citizens and government. The notions of obligation and authority are central to the way we understand the role of law in society. If someone standing on a street corner told you to wear a helmet while riding your bicycle, you would probably reply, “says who?”, or something less polite. But if your town council got together and enacted an ordinance requiring bicycle riders to wear helmets within the town limits, you would probably conclude that you now have a reason to wear a helmet, even if you did not think you did before the new law was passed. One way to put this point is that law purports or claims to have authority over its subjects, even if sometimes it turns out not to have authority. A legal system claims to issue commands that its subjects regard as binding. The law says bicycle riders have to wear helmets ... so they have to wear helmets. One must do what the law says because it is the law.

Business · Law and economics · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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