Vagueness and alternative logic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23161284 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hilary Putnam (Harvard University Press, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Pages | 271-286 |
| Publication date | 2010-02-17 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Realism and Reason (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/cbo9780511625275.017 |
| OpenAlex | W2146501578 |
| ISBN | 9780511625275 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Michael Dummett (1975) has argued that logic and metaphysics are intimately connected. While Dummett's arguments are based upon considerations from the philosophy of language, rather than upon the actual history of logic and metaphysics, I believe that the history of these subjects suggests that Dummett is right. G. E. L. Owen has pointed out† that the notion of a 'property' was neither an evident nor a simple one for either Aristotle or Plato. We can say of a man that he is a 'white man'; but if we ask whether the man is white in the way that a white wall is white, we shall have to answer 'no'. What 'white' is is not specified, Aristotle thought, until we say what sort of thing we are predicating it of, taking as the standard, or whatever. But what if the term we use to answer this question has the same relativity?
Epistemology · Fuzzy logic · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Property (philosophy) · Simple (philosophy) · Vagueness · White (mutation) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 1996 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |