Aristotle on Primary Time in Physics 6

Bibliographic Data

ID23163437
AuthorsBenjamin Morison (0000-0002-6574-8058, corresponding author)
Year2013
Pages149-194
Publication date2013-11-28
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 45 (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199679430.003.0005
OpenAlexW2555192871
ISBN9780199679430
LanguageEN
Citations received8

In Physics 6.5 Aristotle argues that changes have no beginning, but they do have an end. This has usually been understood as the claim that there is no first instant of change, but that there is a last instant. However, Aristotle does not talk about first (or last) instants of change, but instead the ‘primary time’ in which something started or finished changing. The primary time of something is akin to the primary place of something, familiar from Physics 4.1-5; it can be glossed as the most precise time at which the thing happened. This chapter elucidates (through an analysis of the Greek perfect tense) Aristotle’s twin arguments that there is no most precise time at which something started to change and that there is a most precise time at which something finished changing, as are similar results concerning rest in Physics 6.8. His claim that changes have no beginning is defended against two philosophical objections.

Epistemology · Instant · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Rest (music) · Theoretical physics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy

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