Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature

A Feminist Critique of Rawls’ Theory of Justice

Bibliographic Data

ID23166679
AuthorsMasahiko Matsuda (0000-0003-4757-4004, corresponding author), Mari J Matsuda
Year2017
Pages47-64
Publication date2017-07-05
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueGender and Justice (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9781315093727-5
OpenAlexW2785270513
ISBN9781315093727
LanguageEN
Citations received10

This chapter presents the thesis, derived from feminist theory, that John Rawls' "theory of justice" fails because of its central choice of abstraction as a method of inquiry. Abstraction as a methodology encompasses the belief that visions of social life can be constructed without reference to the concrete realities of social life. The chapter reviews the primary elements of Rawls' theory and feminist theory. It notes the assumptions about human nature inherent in Rawls' theory, and then suggests equally plausible counterassumptions derived from feminist thought. Rawls' neo-Kantian defense of liberalism is one of the most widely read and carefully constructed extant in modern Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is complex, internally logical, and comprehensive. The social order defended by the theory is an improved version of American liberal democracy. In Rawls' world, which he modestly does not designate a utopia, the rights of the individual to personal autonomy and political recognition are paramount.

Economic Justice · Jurisprudence · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Vision · Anthropology · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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