The Organizational Basis of Rewarding Regulation

Contingency, Flexibility, and Accountability in the Brazilian Labor Inspectorate

Bibliographic Data

ID2317299
AuthorsRoberto R C Pires (0000-0001-9392-949X, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasilia, Brazil, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume41
Issue4
Pages621-646
Publication date2013-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLatin American Politics and Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1531-426X • E-ISSN: 1548-2456
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0032329213507554
OpenAlexW2129677670
LanguageEN
Citations received5

Rewarding regulation involves pursuing the complex goal of bringing labor protection and firms' economic performance together. A central element in achieving such goals refers to how regulatory bureaucracies operate. This paper examines the organizational structures, processes, and internal dynamics that allow regulatory bureaucracies to innovate and meet such developmental challenges. It reviews well-established interpretations about state bureaucracies that have emphasized either hierarchical structures and control processes or discretion and disperse individual behaviors. In addition, it suggests alternative analytical paths for combining flexibility and control by examining the relational processes and dynamics within bureaucracies. The analysis of the Brazilian Labor Inspectorate, based on qualitative data and extensive fieldwork, and of other empirical examples from the literature, indicates that internal tensions and conflicts instigate a process of technical vigilance between members of the same bureaucracy, inducing innovation and responsible uses of discretion

Bureaucracy · Business · Control (management · Discretion · Economics · Flexibility (engineering · Management · Organizational structure · Political science · Process (computing · Computer Science · Global trade, sustainability, and social impact · Law · Regulation and Compliance Studies

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