Feminist Conceptions of Autonomy

Bibliographic Data

ID23175306
AuthorsCatriona Mackenzie (0000-0002-3222-0257, corresponding author)
Year2017
Pages515-527
Publication date2017-09-19
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueRoutledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9781315758152-42
OpenAlexW4254705241
ISBN9781315758152
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited1

Autonomy is both a status and a capacity concept. As a status concept, it refers to the idea that individuals are entitled to exercise self-determining authority over their own lives. A foundational principle of liberal democratic societies is that each individual should be respected as having this authority. Procedural theories explain the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular preference, motive, commitment, or value to count as autonomous by appealing to a critical reflection procedure of some kind. There is substantial debate in the literature concerning the meaning of authenticity and the necessary and sufficient conditions for authentic critical reflection. Relational autonomy theorists argue, that, an analysis is not sufficient to distinguish autonomous from non-autonomous reflection. Competence conditions specify the range of the competences or skills a person must possess, to some degree at least, in order to be self-governing.

Autonomy · Epistemology · Political science · Sociology · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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