Giving Up Levelling Down

Bibliographic Data

ID23178282
AuthorsCampbell Brown (0000-0001-9821-9710, Australian National University, corresponding author)
Year2003
Volume19
Issue1
Pages111-134
Publication date2003-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomics and Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0266-2671 • E-ISSN: 1474-0028
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0266267103001044
OpenAlexW2167585667
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited2

The so-called “Levelling Down Objection” is commonly believed to occupy a central role in the debate between egalitarians and prioritarians. Egalitarians think that equality is good in itself, and so they are committed to finding value even in such equality as may only be achieved by “levelling down”–i.e., by merely reducing the better off to the level of the worse off. Although egalitarians might deny that levelling down could ever make for an all-things-considered improvement, they cannot deny that it may make things better in at least one respect. Prioritarians, on the other hand, do deny this; according to them, levelling down cannot make things better in any respect. In this paper I argue that the Levelling Down Objection leans far too heavily on a heretofore unanalysed notion: namely, the notion of “being better in this or that respect.” I propose what I take to be a plausible analysis of that notion, and show that, given the proposed analysis, the prioritarian is no less vulnerable to the Levelling Down Objection than is the egalitarian. I conclude that proponents of the Levelling Down Objection need either to suggest a better analysis or abandon the Levelling Down Objection altogether.

Geodesy · Geography · Levelling · Political science · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub