Logic and the autonomy of ethics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23182011 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Charles Pigden (University of Otago, corresponding author), Charles R Pigden |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 127-151 |
| Publication date | 1989-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048408912343731 |
| OpenAlex | W2150602032 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 34 |
In every system of morality I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it. David Hume, Treatise, III.i.3. 1.
Autonomy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Political science · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Testy modelu świata i teorii umysłu jako podstawa budowy zaufania do podmiotów moralnych typu AGI
Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation
Is’–‘Ought’ Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies
Giving up Hume's Guillotine
Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement
Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts
From Ideal Worlds to Ideality
Why Do We “Must” and “Should”?—Bridging the Gap from “Is” to “Ought”
The Reliable Route from Nonmoral Evidence to Moral Conclusions
On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law
Two Versions of Hume's Law
Beyond Ought-Implies-Can
The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion
Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean “is-ought” dictum
No normative free lunch
Truthmaking and the is–ought gap
Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”
Can the empirical sciences contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate
Against inferential moral knowledge
Business ethics, the social sciences, and moral philosophy
New Studies in Deontic Logic
Proofs and Refutations
Modal Logic
Moral Thinking
A Short History of Ethics
Good and Evil
Whatever happened to Deontic Logic?
The Is-Ought Question
A Short History of Ethics
Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge
The autonomy of ethics
Problems of the Self
Whatever happened to deontic logic?
Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions
Logic and the Basis of Ethics
On the Logic of Norms and Actions
Reason, Truth and History
Deontic Logic
David Hume
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is
Defining the Autonomy of Ethics
Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness
The British Moralists
| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,65 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2025 (31) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |