The End of Hegel’s Logic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23185071 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Angelica Nuzzo (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Pages | 187-205 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Hegel's Theory of the Subject (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/9780230522626_14 |
| OpenAlex | W2489638313 |
| ISBN | 9780230522626 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
The last chapter of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik is a test for the entire preceding logical development and, thereby, a test for the success of the book as a whole. It is only at this point – namely, at the conclusion of the itinerary of pure speculative–dialectical thinking – that it is possible (and necessary) for Hegel to demonstrate that the logic which has been immanently developed in its successive moments is, indeed, the speculative science laying the foundations of the philosophical system and leading on to a Realphilosophie. The aim of the final test taking place in the chapter on method is twofold. First, Hegel needs to show that the logical process now approaching its conclusion can by no means be exploited by a non-dialectical way of thinking. In other words, he needs to prove that only dialectical thinking can use or appropriate the logical process it has developed up to this point in order to construct knowledge and produce science. The claim to be justified is that the foregoing succession of logical forms is, indeed, the method of speculative thinking, and of this thinking alone. Second, Hegel needs to demonstrate that the logic, as a concluded and complete discipline, is a system and can therefore lead forward to the expanse of a system of philosophy. The two points are clearly connected as parts of the same systematic project. The notion of method designates, for Hegel, this constellation of issues
Epistemology · Hegelianism · Computer Science · Philosophy · Political Economy and Marxism
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2021 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |