A Defence of Common Sense

Bibliographic Data

ID23185608
AuthorsGeorge Edward Moore (corresponding author)
Year2014
Pages32-59
Publication date2014-06-03
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenuePhilosophical Papers (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9781315823560-2
OpenAlexW3004641271
ISBN9781315823560
LanguageEN
Citations received24

The chapter presents some of the most important points in which philosophical position differs from positions taken up by philosophers. Some philosophers seem to have thought legitimate to use the word &s;true&s; in a sense that a proposition which is partially false may nevertheless also be true; and some of these, therefore, would perhaps say that propositions are in their view, true, when all the time they believe that every such proposition is partially false. This chapter introduces four expressions namely, &s;material things are not real&s;, &s;space is not real&s;, &s;time is not real&s; and &s;the self is not real&s; unlike the expressions used here is really ambiguous. Any view, therefore, incompatible with the proposition that many propositions corresponding to each of the propositions can only be true on the hypothesis that no philosopher has ever held any such view. The chapter also presents facts such as &s;physical fact&s; and &s;mental fact&s;.

Common sense · Electrical engineering · Epistemology · Sense (electronics) · Engineering · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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