The “Focusing Illusion” of Rawlsian Ideal Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23187373 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Colin Farrelly (0000-0002-3889-3778, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Pages | 61-72 |
| Publication date | 2020-09-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | John Rawls (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780190859213.003.0006 |
| OpenAlex | W3045239474 |
| ISBN | 9780190859213 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructed and defended an abstract account of distributive justice founded upon hypothetical theoretical devices like the original position and veil of ignorance, the principle of maximin, and conceptual analyses of equality of opportunities. Such a methodology places a premium on abstract hypotheticals (vs. the actual history of injustice), and idealizations that involve making claims that are actually false, in order to simplify an argument. This chapter critically examines the idealizations employed by Rawls’s original theory of justice. It argues that Rawlsian ideal theory is inherently flawed because Rawls’s idealizations make our normative theorizing prone to the valuation distortions that arise in what psychologists call a “focusing illusion.”
Cognitive psychology · Economics · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Illusion · Mathematical economics · Physics · Theoretical physics · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2023 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |