Are Rawlsian Considerations of Corporate Governance Illiberal? A Reply to Singer

Bibliographic Data

ID23190020
AuthorsSandrine Blanc (0000-0003-0706-2485, INSEEC School of Business and Economics, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume26
Issue3
Pages407-421
Publication date2016-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBusiness Ethics Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1052-150X • E-ISSN: 2153-3326
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/beq.2016.43
OpenAlexW2512808943
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited28

Singer has recently argued that questions related to corporate governance are beyond the reach of Rawls’s political conception of justice. This is because justice applies to the basic structure of society, understood as society’s legally coercive structures, and because corporate governance cannot be considered part of this structure in political liberalism. This commentary challenges the second part of the argument. First, it suggests that the criterion used to exclude corporate governance from the basic structure—whether employees can exit economic organizations—is not conclusive for corporate governance, notably as institutionalized in corporate law. Second, even if the focus were on corporate governance, it would still be possible to argue that it legally coerces citizens, if not employees, in a relevant way. Thus, the argument is not successful in demonstrating that political liberalism goes beyond its legitimate boundaries when considering that aspects of corporate governance may be matters of justice.

Argument (complex analysis) · Corporate governance · Economic Justice · Economics · Law and economics · Liberalism · Management · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub