The Possibility of a Fair Play Account of Legitimacy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23196752 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Justin Tosi (0000-0001-5820-1831, University of Arizona, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 88-99 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rati.12114 |
| OpenAlex | W2099523609 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 9 |
The philosophical literature on state legitimacy has recently seen a significant conceptual revision. Several philosophers have argued that the state's right to rule is better characterized not as a claim right to obedience, but as a power right. There have been few attempts to show that traditional justifications for the claim right might also be used to justify a power right, and there have been no such attempts involving the principle of fair play, which is widely regarded as the most promising basis for a claim right to obedience. William Edmundson argues that the principle of fair play cannot generate power rights, and so any attempt at a fair play account of legitimacy must fail. I explain how fair play could generate a power right, owing to its stipulation that the rules of a cooperative scheme specify the form of participants' repayment.
Epistemology · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Obedience · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Sociology · State (computer science) · Stipulation · Computer Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |