Basic Logical Knowledge

At least some of us, at least some of the time—when not in the grip of radical sceptical doubt—are inclined to believe that we know, for example, that if we infer a conclusion from two true premises, one a conditional whose consequent is that conclusion and the other the antecedent of that conditional, then our conclusion must be true, or that we know similar things about other simple patterns of inference. If we do indeed have knowledge of this sort, it is what I mean by logical knowledge. Logical knowledge is, roughly speaking, knowledge about logic—such as knowledge that a certain principle of inference necessarily preserves truth, or that every proposition of a certain form must be true—and so is not the same thing as knowledge that is gained by using logic, i.e. inferential knowledge. That is not to say, of course, that logical knowledge can't be inferential. On the contrary, it is barely open to question that—if there is any logical knowledge at all—there is a lot of inferential logical knowledge.

Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Psychology

• Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws

  Open Access•Crispin Wright•dialectica•2004

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• Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I)

  Open Access•Ben Martin, Ole Thomassen Hjortland•Philosophy Compass•2024

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