God and State in Egypt

Photo: Rowan El ShimiCAIRO—During a private conversation following Egypt’s bitterly contested and closely fought presidential election of 2012, a Western diplomat marveled, naively, at the multitudes of veiled women who had come out to support the old regime’s candidate, the avowedly anti-Islamist figure of Ahmed Shafik. It was during this campaign that strongly held anti-Islamist themes were aired widely and used to mount a campaign against the potent, often bigoted, Muslim Brotherhood. Many of these same views were advanced in support of the military’s removal of the Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, victorious candidate for the presidency and, with his electoral victory, successor to President Hosni Mubarak.More recently, with the presidential campaign of the former military leader Field Marshall Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, statist and traditionalist views of Egypt have been offered as a clear distinction from the Islamist project of social engineering along religious lines. The personally pious Sisi has explicitly rejected the notion of a religious state and has chided the immoderate vein of contemporary Islamist thought. Sisi has even argued that “the religious discourse in the entire Islamic world has cost Islam its humanity,” and has further added that there “must be an enlightened religious discourse to protect society from alien ideas.” These declarations complement the broader backlash to rising militancy and the beginnings of a reappraisal of their underlying politics. For the first time in the recent history of Egypt, and indeed much of the modern Middle East, anti-Islamism and the struggle against political Islam is not solely confined to the state and its security establishment. Instead, nationalist populism during this chaotic period in Egypt’s history has produced an organic, broad-based anti-Islamist vernacular.Under normal circumstances, this turn might have enormous potential. At its root, political Islam argues that religion should play an ever-increasing role in public and political life, and sees this path as the only possible course to remedy the many ills of the contemporary Arab world. For Islamists, effective renewal can only happen if state and society are bound by religious strictures. This brand of religious supremacism is inherently contradictory to an open, democratic, and pluralistic society. It is also woefully under-equipped to deal with the myriad and daunting challenges facing the Arab world. However, the critique of Islamist politics taking place in Egypt is tragically overshadowed by the country’s authoritarian relapse and the fantastical nature of current Egyptian political discourse.While much criticism of Islamism and its intentions is pointed and grounded, it is also joined by excessive amounts of hyper-nationalist hysteria, conspiracy-addled bigotry, and state violence and repression. These excesses are tragic and counterproductive in their own right, and the current moment is unlikely to produce positive and sustainable politics. This alternative discourse is also not rooted in any vision of religious liberty and freedom. Many of the traditional restrictions placed on religious expression remain. The role of the state is to limit the kinds of permissible religious expression and potential sources of immoderation.Despite these manifest flaws in the political discourse, recent events have clarified some of the dividing lines within Egyptian society and highlighted the divergent conceptions of the role of religion in public life.As a beaming President Gamal Abdel Nasser looked out over a large assembled and adoring crowd, he recounted his 1953 meeting with Hassan el-Houdaiby, the second General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood and the successor to the organization’s founder, Hassan el-Banna. Within the Brotherhood, Houdaiby is perhaps best remembered for his clash with el-jihaz el-sirri, the secret armed apparatus of the Brotherhood, which had previously been engaged in violence and terrorism. For the charismatic Nasser, however, his encounter with the General Guide served a rhetorical prop, to underscore both his attempts to reconcile with the Brothers and the unreasonable nature of their outlook. While the Brothers had supported Nasser’s Free Officers Movement and the 1952 ouster of King Farouk, the Egyptian regime would soon turn on the Brotherhood with a vengeance. Nasser’s speech, a few years after the repressive weight of the state had already crippled the organization, did not focus on allegations of violence or seditious activity, but instead on the intrusive and regressive religious views of the Brothers. According to Nasser, when given the prized opportunity to address Egypt’s leading political figure at a time of crisis, Houdaiby’s first demand was that veiling be made mandatory, so that “every woman who walks in the streets wears a veil.”This first salvo from Nasser elicited audible and incredulous laughter from the crowd. Having primed them, he continued, noting his philosophical objection to such state behavior: instead of compulsion, “everyone in their own home is responsible for implementing such things.” With this important rejoinder, meant to illuminate the proper balance between religion and state, Nasser noted Houdaiby’s admonition that “you, as the leader, are responsible.” Having perfectly unspooled his anecdote, Nasser was ready to now proceed to his punch lines. “You, sir, have a daughter in medical school. She’s not wearing a veil or anything. Why didn’t you make her wear the veil?” At this point the crowd broke out in extended laughter and applause. Nasser then finished his story, repressing his own urge to join in the laughter. “If you can’t make one girl, that is your daughter, wear the veil, you want me to go out and force 10 million veils by myself?”The speech offers a window into the bygone social mores of mid-20th century Egypt, and stands as a testament to the rightward turn that would soon grip a disillusioned Arab world in the midst of a religious revival. While compulsory veiling was so far from the ideological mainstream as to be the source of a joke in the Nasser era, the ideas ridiculed by Nasser would soon form the basis of a regressive social and political movement that would fundamentally alter the social fabric of the Middle East. Far from Nasser’s understanding of private religiosity separate and apart from state authority, these nascent forms of secular thought in the Arab world would wither along with the unrealized dreams of mid-century Arab nationalism. In the search for alternatives, more intrusive and all-encompassing understandings of religion would become the touchstone for much of the region’s social and political thought. The role of religion in public life would change dramatically in the second half of the 20th century based on both evolving social views and the attempts of the authoritarian Arab political order to insulate itself from the political challenges posed by Islamism.With the series of uprisings that would come to be known as the Arab Spring, it appeared that this evident erosion of the boundaries between political and religious life would necessarily herald the ultimate triumph of political Islam. In some important respects, political Islam has already triumphed. The terms of reference of Arab political and social life have been altered in many of the ways Islamists have long sought. In many instances they have succeeded in narrowing the boundaries of permissible public discourse. These incremental triumphs have kept pace with the increasing religiosity of public life and show no signs of receding.But these trends do not necessarily herald the political triumph of Islamists. Religion and piety will remain central features of public and political life, and Islamist political actors represent a key and enduring political grouping with a deeply rooted constituency. However, we should be skeptical of arguments about the inevitable ascendancy of Islamist political actors who reject this status quo and espouse a broader Islamist project, often seeking to bend the state to religious aims as opposed to using religion to further the aims of the state. This critical, albeit amorphous, distinction—between a conservative, religiously influenced public sphere where Islamic ethics inform political life and a theocratically inclined politics defined by religious stricture—represents an enduring fault line within the region. In the Arab world of today, piety and religiously infused politics are hardly synonymous with Islamism, despite the lack of secular alternatives and the eclipse of secular thought.These trends are perhaps most evident in Egypt, which encapsulates many of these post-1967 political trends and offers important signals as to the direction of the region’s politics. The broad sweep of contemporary Arab history and Egypt’s present circumstances suggest the intermingling of religion and political life is now firmly rooted, but has potentially plateaued.The June 1967 Six-Day War and the crushing defeat of the Arab armies by Israel was, according to Beirut-born scholar, the late Professor Malcolm Kerr, “a bolt of lightning that transformed the whole atmosphere of inter-Arab politics....There could hardly be a competition for prestige when there was no prestige remaining.” More than lost prestige, the defeat was a remarkable humiliation that upended the established order and exposed its threadbare legacy.In the revisionist rush to re-examine the Arab predicament, those calling for religious revival were given a boost by the serial failures of the region’s post-colonial and ostensibly secular leaders. With the death of Nasser in 1970 and the reorientation of the Egyptian state under his successor, Anwar el-Sadat, events evolved in a fashion that continued to bolster the fortunes of Islamists while also altering the nature of Arab society. Of course, the most salient feature of authoritarian politics in the Arab world was the forcible repression of alternative and dissenting thoughts, ideologies, institutions, and organizations. This was an authoritarian system with no room for mobilization, pluralism, or the political parties through which varied sentiments could be conveyed and contested. This destruction of organized political life created huge opportunities for Islamists and organizational advantages that have, in certain circumstances, endured to the present day. There could be no clearer testament to that historical reality than the chaos, fractiousness, and incoherence that typified the trajectory of post-Mubarak liberal political parties.The approach to Islamists under Sadat, who lacked an institutional or ideological base of support, softened as the new president sought to use Islamist political actors as a bulwark against his Nasserist foes and other enemies to the left. While Sadat’s shift had a large impact on the revival of the Muslim Brotherhood, he also enacted a variety of policies that sought both to capitalize on evolving religious views and further distance his regime from that of his predecessor. Most notable among these changes was the introduction of Article 2 in the Egyptian constitution, which mandated that “the principles of the Islamic Shariah are a chief source of legislation.”The change was a marked shift for Egypt. The nation had modernized its legal and judicial systems in the late 19th century to minimize the role of Islamic law, which at the time controlled only matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.This shift could be seen in how the state itself began reviewing and revising Egyptian laws to comply with newly-tightened religious strictures. Article 2 was further narrowed as the word “a” in the article was amended to “the,” making Shariah the ultimate constitutional benchmark.While the full impact of these changes would only be seen in later years, they reflected the erosion of the boundaries between state authority and religious life, creating a new status quo. It should come as no surprise that during this period, sectarian tensions, long an undercurrent in Egyptian society, deteriorated further and resulted in notable instances of conflict and violence.Of course, these developments took place in the context of a Arab world where in to the Arab The of these changes further the region’s religious and of religious of the which produced the has a of that and and those that or produce was the increasing of certain to of Islam the Middle East. These more at the of were also by the of to the where and were often in the more of Islam that held then home with this the Arab the of the and the of the Islamic further the Islamist despite the region’s The of and the of the the Muslim as Arab joined the against the and its These and and to important Islamist the of the the conflict and the nature of of further and The notion of Islamist was by Arab such as and the the Arab authoritarian order continued its and its while signs of a political was in Islamist Islamism was for many the for political Islamists also were and in and into and that created the of social political Islam further Egypt was a social that would public At this could be seen in the social mores the of women and the of the or veil, as the expression of and of piety and Egyptian could often be seen with the of piety on their the a of religiosity through extended and of the ways public and religious had come to be were often by authoritarian such as Egypt, where of trends served as attempts to the regime against the of Islamist criticism and The of society and public life had from the rising and of sectarian and to the of discourse to the of thought and of the legal this the legal against the on is of many of these The was by a and was an of a that during the In Egypt’s of the of based on his and his as a and his to the and was an and a society that had a bigoted, and understanding of religion and an of how such religious views should be by the state. This was the despite the secular views of such as Egypt’s who sought to insulate their from criticism by as against the rising of trends the to the uprisings that began in in The of the of the typified by the and of has been and by the and violence that has come to be with the of the of the these social was a of both their and the of many of those in and while more an role in the beginnings of the movement that the they were in a society and political that had and many of the by Islamists. The of liberal political as opposed to was and even among this it was that the public of liberal political ideas was to be at was this clearer than on the of role in a new In with Egyptian during the and after the of and political the of public discourse, with to Article 2 of the Islamists, who were for a more of a series of on political the as a to these public that the time was not for a over Article 2 and the of liberal his in the following and can we In the terms of the that of the Article 2 a with to possible and constitutional as a against more in these to the political are However, when against the of other Islamists, the are the more Egypt in he his Islamist when he the of to be of and that he that will be a secular state in At the many in Egypt and and his and as a potential for the region’s Islamist politics. his that not that are For not but the of a secular his views were rejected by Egypt’s Islamists. The ultimate of course, is that public views on and his of Shariah a more liberal than that offered by Egypt’s and can be seen in the approach and of an avowedly Islamist that after the of President El While in a more political with more on their most were a more approach to the role of religion in the In the by in the no of Islamic law, and only that Islam is the religion of the state. While other and potentially the with a broad of among Islamists, and an more liberal even than the by Egypt’s liberal constitutional important into the ways certain Islamist have become the place for political in Egypt and a that even liberal political actors and parties views are of public and the status quo. however, they are not necessarily synonymous with the broader Islamist This offers an important into the politics of Egypt and a of trends where lines are at a with to the of increasing of Egyptian public life has had a impact on the political of in Egypt and has a religious revival at the social from the of public life, many sought in the This despite the created by the Egyptian has to be which is a ideological of the religious supremacism by the Brotherhood and other Islamist under the of President and his While is deeply rooted in Egyptian society and long Morsi, the of in the post-Mubarak period has and over the ultimate intentions of the Brotherhood and other Islamist however, it has not created a clearer among and as to the of the religious from the political world. It is that the of the has continued to the distinction between the and the world of the era, as the public the its as the of its a to with these trends have continued and have been by Egypt’s The support for the ouster of and the has already sectarian among Egypt’s Islamists and the of a series of the continued political role of the of the often as the between the state and the has served to a of politics that religion and state. These are at trends in Egyptian society, the religion has come to play a role in public Egypt’s and to from its much has the of the political which have often been into the of recent events make this is and a of the country’s politics out of with Egypt’s It also the ways and on the one and nationalist on the from organized The of are liberal secular and to in the important role of religion in the public and the role of the state. Egypt is in for pluralism, and these are not to an of Islamism as by the Muslim Brotherhood and other of political the Islamist current a and rooted within Egypt and the broader Arab world. Islamism is not to in the of current given the opportunity to in the Muslim Brotherhood will be a force to the organizational and advantages will over time and are salient at the of presidential the Brotherhood has much to if it to in the The in which Islamists to this current period of and often repression will also their It is that we will within this with the current moment both and of the Islamist movement in Egypt and the support for Islamism has in Egypt and in other of the Arab world. While many and were to Islamists an as the its such sentiments were as the and much of this In often at the notion that the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist had a on and were of an enlightened This could be in the of at the that the Brotherhood was to and of society how to be In an important the and of the Brothers their religious the Brotherhood’s focus on and but the crushing that Egyptian society was to and which the both and to In the for a religious was in the form of Egypt’s constitution, which was later after the ouster of support the current status quo with to the role of religion in public broad of society from the and deeply held views of the Islamist political which the of society For many this amounts to an that they are than Muslim and from the more among society. There is also a further that the state is at the of and that boundaries between religious and political life should be or This of the status quo a more in key within Egyptian society, the the and the as as among were often lost on those who the of Islamism as the region’s new and enduring political the of nationalist the region’s politics are The of the current struggle over and will only be through and features that have been in during and Egypt’s and its role on the developments there will to have impact in the Arab world by of its and of its and on Egypt’s this is a for authoritarian relapse is unlikely to be in The support for the military and with the of and the of Egyptian society, that the country’s has come and The opportunity by the of was and into a of Egypt is not to the status quo At one the regime is not a of the new is in and the regime now and support in new ways and from new more Egyptian society has This central is by the and of much current political discourse and the public support for the regime’s repressive in key of society, when seen in old ways of have been created by the and its have new new and new This period has also the of discourse and the of The by the of and is unlikely to the that would will but both authoritarian and Islamism are to and Egypt. It is in this that alternatives will necessarily the and the with Egypt will be a on the trajectory of the is unlikely to be to its and will of and The of the might even this of over time if no course are if the is fundamentally will not produce political in Egypt. the and its should to Egypt to a to and a of its politics. and support can have some impact at the however, the events of point to a key that the and the the sources of change within Egyptian those of change already and will over to the status quo. are to a alternative to that status then they will now have to and to the of political life as the Brotherhood has so for will also have to with Egypt’s of and that can impact the of they will have to and an vision of society that is of Egypt’s In there are no

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