Is Government Supererogation Possible?

Bibliographic Data

ID23201307
AuthorsJustin Weinberg (University of South Carolina, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume92
Issue2
Pages263-281
Publication date2011-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01392.x
OpenAlexW2169573543
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited20

Governments are subject to the requirements of justice, yet often seem to go above and beyond what justice requires in order to act in ways many people think are good. These kinds of acts – examples of which include putting on celebrations, providing grants to poets, and preserving historic architecture – appear to be acts of government supererogation. In this paper, I argue that a common view about the relationship between government, coercion, and justice implies that most such acts are not supererogatory, but wrong. Many will find that conclusion unattractive, but rejecting the common view that implies it raises problems, too.

Business · Coercion (linguistics) · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Government (linguistics) · Law and economics · Linguistics · Order (exchange) · Political science · Sociology · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics