Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance
A Critique of Regan’s Theory of Rights
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23203118 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dale Jamieson (0000-0001-9991-8476, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Pages | 177-190 |
| Publication date | 2017-05-15 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Animal Rights (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.4324/9781315262529-13 |
| OpenAlex | W4245746086 |
| ISBN | 9781315262529 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
This chapter presents an overview of Tom Regan's theory, and then it critically examines two areas in which it is most problematic: its account of our duties to render assistance and its principles for overriding rights. It argues that Regan's theory has serious problems and that the most plausible revisions would lead Regan back in the direction of utilitarianism. Regan believes that in some circumstances we are permitted or required to override the rights of innocent creatures. He distinguishes the following cases in which this is so: "self-defense by the innocent", "punishment of the guilty", "innocent shields", "innocent threats", and "prevention cases". Regan has two principles for overriding rights in these cases: the Miniride Principle which, when harms are comparable, requires one to save the greatest number of innocents; and the Worse-Off Principle which, when harms are not comparable, requires us to bring about the outcome in which the worst-off are less worse-off than in any alternative outcome.
Criminology · Economic Justice · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Citations per year | 0.14 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2015 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |