On Dissing Public Reason
A Reply to Enoch
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23205569 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gerald Gaus (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 125 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1078-1095 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/680904 |
| OpenAlex | W2302714817 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 7 |
This essay responds to David Enoch’s “The Disorder of Public Reason,” published in a previous issue of Ethics. I seek to set the record straight on several of the many charges Enoch makes. More importantly, having clarified some of the more basic points, I make some preliminary efforts at identifying when his brand of moral realism and my version of public reason differ—and, perhaps, where they are more compatible than one might think.
Epistemology · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Political science · Politics · Public reason · Realism · Set (abstract data type) · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
On Confucian Public Reason
Convergence liberalism and the problem of disagreement concerning public justification
In Defense of Idealization in Public Reason
The Social Philosophy of Gerald Gaus
Constructing the Abstract Individual
Public Reason Illiberalism and Ideology
Civic equality as a democratic basis for public reason
When Does Balancing Justify Religious Exemptions? The Case of Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
Against insular liberalism
An epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement
Interests from and in conventions
Three vulnerability objections to justice as mutual advantage
| Citations per year | 1.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |