Introduction
Liberal Constitutions During Financial Crises
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23213620 |
|---|---|
| Authors | T Ginsburg (0000-0003-3128-3392, University of Chicago), Mark D Rosen (Illinois Institute of Technology), Georg Vanberg (0000-0002-6228-6679, Duke University) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Pages | 3-17 |
| Publication date | 2019-06-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/9781108679404.001 |
| OpenAlex | W4239813580 |
| ISBN | 9781108679404 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
The constitutions of most liberal democracies contain provisions that constrain governmental action in relation to economic policy. Some provisions grant citizens rights: For example, Americans enjoy a right under the US constitution's Contract Clause, prohibiting states from impairing the obligation of contracts. Most constitutions also provide individual rights protections against uncompensated and arbitrary taking of property. Structural provisions of constitutions also affect economic policy, sometimes by limiting government action directly, rather than through the claims of citizens. For example, balanced-budget rules constrain fiscal decision-making, as do legislative supermajorities required by some constitutions for financial decisions. Such structural provisions have spread in recent years, especially in response to the great recession of 2007 and 2008.
Action (physics) · Constitution · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Law and economics · Legislature · Limiting · Obligation · Political science · Property rights · Law · Political Economy and Marxism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |