Kantian perspectives on paternalism

Bibliographic Data

ID23213783
AuthorsMelissa Seymour Fahmy (corresponding author)
Year2018
Pages96-107
Publication date2018-01-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueRoutledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9781315657080-9
OpenAlexW2905221547
ISBN9781315657080
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited1

This chapter explicates the Kantian opposition to paternalism by means of three distinct points. The first and most fundamental point concerns the status of mature agents as ends in themselves. From the Kantian perspective, paternalistic interference is a failure of respect insofar as it entails treating a competent adult merely as means to her own welfare, interests, or even her own ends. The second point conjoins social and psychological facts about human moral development with a distinctly Kantian conception of the relative worth of particular ends. While happiness and discretionary ends are by no means unimportant in Kant’s theory, they are subordinate to virtue. Insofar as paternalistic interference aims to promote the well-being of another at the possible expense of undermining the development of her rational powers, the paternalist wrongly prioritizes well-being over self-development. The third and final point concerns the innate right to freedom, which is the foundation of Kant’s political theory. Forms of paternalism that restrict an agent’s freedom solely for the sake of promoting her welfare are doubly wrong: they are rights violations as well as failures of respect.

Epistemology · Paternalism · Political science · Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology

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