Are Fundamental Laws Necessary or Contingent?
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23213808 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Noa Latham (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Pages | 97-112 |
| Publication date | 2011-10-28 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Carving nature at its joints (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | The MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.003.0005 |
| OpenAlex | W134312708 |
| ISBN | 9780262015936 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
This chapter focuses on the dispute between necessitarians and contingentists, mainly addressing the issue as to whether laws of nature are metaphysically necessary or metaphysically contingent with a weaker kind of necessity, commonly referred to as natural, nomological, or nomic necessity. It is assumed here that all fundamental properties are dispositional or role properties, making the dispute a strictly verbal one. The existence of categorical intrinsic properties as well as dispositional properties is also assumed and the relationship between them examined. Finally, the chapter concludes by returning to the debate between necessitarians and contingentists under the assumption that both dispositional and categorical fundamental properties exist. It is argued here that necessitarian positions can be recast as contingentist, but that there are unequivocally contingentist positions preferred because they are less mysterious despite being ontologically more complex.
Categorical variable · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Natural (archaeology) · Natural law · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2021 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |