Humor as Philosophical Subversion

Especially in the Skeptics

Bibliographic Data

ID23214399
AuthorsRichard Bett (corresponding author)
Year2019
Pages208-226
Publication date2019-10-24
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueLaughter, Humor, and Comedy in Ancient Philosophy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/oso/9780190460549.003.0011
OpenAlexW2973967433
ISBN9780190460549
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited44

Positive philosophical projects and humor do not generally go together. When humor is used, it is often to draw attention to where one might go wrong: someone or something is made fun of. This point is first illustrated with cases in Aristotle. But if this is a major function of humor in philosophy, it offers special opportunities to those whose entire approach to philosophy is critical rather than constructive—those who are suspicious of the whole project of philosophy. This chapter examines a number of instances of this subversive form of humor in philosophy. For the reason just stated, it concentrates on the ancient Greek skeptics, both Academic and Pyrrhonian, with a particular focus on Sextus Empiricus, the only Greek skeptic of whom we have complete works. But Stoics and Epicureans (and, in passing, Plato) also receive some attention, and there are occasional comparisons with examples in more recent philosophy (Nietzsche and Gettier).

Art · Constructive · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Literature · Skepticism · Subversion · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism

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