Akrasia and conflict in the Nicomachean Ethics

Bibliographic Data

ID23214410
AuthorsMehmet Metin Erginel
Year2016
Volume24
Issue4
Pages573-593
Publication date2016-07-03
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2016.1176890
OpenAlexW2518984150
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited16

In Nicomachean Ethics VII, Aristotle offers an account of akrasia that purports to salvage the kernel of truth in the Socratic paradox that people act against what is best only through ignorance. Despite Aristotle’s apparent confidence in having identified the sense in which Socrates was right about akrasia, we are left puzzling over Aristotle’s own account, and the extent to which he agrees with Socrates. The most fundamental interpretive question concerns the sense in which Aristotle takes the akratic to be ignorant. The received view in the literature has been the intellectualist interpretation, which takes akratic agents to be so ignorant of the wrongness of what they do as to be unaware of it. In recent decades, many scholars have identified serious problems in this interpretation and have moved towards the non-intellectualist reading, the strong version of which takes clearheaded akrasia to be possible. There is, however, a glaring shortage of discussion of the difficulties facing the strong non-intellectualist reading. In this paper, I present what I take to be the most salient reasons for rejecting strong non-intellectualism, and argue that Aristotle’s text supports a moderate non-intellectualism, according to which clearheaded akrasia is impossible.

Epistemology · Ignorance · Intellectualism · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Reading (process) · SOCRATES · Socratic method · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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