Addiction, Weakness of the Will, and Relapse
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23247364 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Olav Gjelsvik (University of Oslo, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Pages | 47-64 |
| Publication date | 1999-03-13 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Getting Hooked (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/cbo9781139173223.004 |
| OpenAlex | W621358603 |
| ISBN | 9781139173223 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Addiction is a puzzle. In some cases, at least, it seems to be a form of voluntary, self-destructive behavior. It may then plausibly be taken as an instance of weakness of will, in the sense (roughly) of acting against one's better judgment. Many addicts want to quit but don't. Many smokers, for instance, believe it would be better, all things considered, if they stopped smoking, but they still continue. In this chapter, I discuss how addiction can be illuminated by two very different conceptions of weakness of will, presented by Donald Davidson and George Ainslie, respectively. Davidson offers a philosophical theory to show that weakness of will is possible, without offering any specific causal mechanism by which it might be brought about. Ainslie, by contrast, offers a highly specific causal mechanism that determines the circumstances in which a person will knowingly act against his interest. Each theory, I shall argue, has strengths and weaknesses. Each may account for some aspect of weakness of will in general, and of addiction more specifically.
Addiction · Weakness · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Medicine · Neuroscience · Psychology · Surgery
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2013 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |