Competitive party democracy and the Keynesian welfare state

Bibliographic Data

ID23249702
AuthorsClaus Offe (corresponding author)
EditorsJohn Keane (0000-0002-6553-3313)
Year2018
Pages179-206
Publication date2018-07-20
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueContradictions of the Welfare State (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9780429464829-9
OpenAlexW2905393003
ISBN9780429464829
LanguageEN
Citations received6

Nineteenth-century liberal political theory and classical Marxism were in full agreement on one major point: both Karl Marx and his liberal contemporaries, such as Mill and de Tocqueville, were convinced that capitalism and full democracy could not mix. The chapter is concerned with the prospects of competitive party democracy in the 1980s it might be worthwhile to explore this possibility a little further. The functional superiority of such corporatist arrangements, compared to both parliamentary-competitive forms of representation and bureaucratic methods of implementation, resides in their informal, inconspicuous and non-public procedures and the 'voluntary' compliance that they are said to be able to mobilize. The functional links between Keynesian economic policy, economic growth and the welfare state are fairly obvious and agreed upon by all 'partners' and parties involves. The Keynesian welfare state has indeed, to a remarkable extent, been able to solve the problem of macro-economic demand stabilization.

Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Keynesian economics · Market economy · Neoclassical economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · Welfare · Welfare state · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Policy · Law · Political Economy and Marxism · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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