Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23325232 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael E Bratman (0000-0001-9424-3537, Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 401 |
| Pages | 1-16 |
| Publication date | 1992-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0026-4423 • E-ISSN: 1460-2113 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/mind/101.401.1 |
| OpenAlex | W2014700282 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 77 |
| References cited | 1 |
Journal Article Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context Get access MICHAEL E. BRATMAN MICHAEL E. BRATMAN Philosophy Department Stanford UniversityStanford CA 94305 USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume 101, Issue 401, January 1992, Pages 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/101.401.1 Published: 01 January 1992
Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 77 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,96 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2026 (27) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 68 |