A Critique of Principlism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID23337706
AutoresK Danner Clouser (0000-0002-5968-094X, Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center), Bernard Gert (Dartmouth College)
Ano1990
Volume15
Fascículo2
Páginas219-236
Data de publicação1990-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Medicine and Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0360-5310 • E-ISSN: 1744-5019
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jmp/15.2.219
PMID2351895
OpenAlexW2021970839
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas62

The authors use the term "principlism" to refer to the practice of using "principles" to replace both moral theory and particular moral rules and ideals in dealing with the moral problems that arise in medical practice. The authors argue that these "principles" do not function as claimed, and that their use is misleading both practically and theoretically. The "principles" are in fact not guides to action, but rather they are merely names for a collection of sometimes superficially related matters for consideration when dealing with a moral problem. The "principles" lack any systematic relationship to each other, and they often conflict with each other. These conflicts are unresolvable, since there is no unified moral theory from which they are all derived. For comparison the authors sketch the advantages of using a unified moral theory.

Action (physics) · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Moral disengagement · Normative ethics · Sketch · Sociology · Computer Science · Ethics in medical practice · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Philosophy