Grounding

Necessary or Contingent?

Bibliographic Data

ID23345200
AuthorsKelly Trogdon (0000-0002-3402-6570, Department of Philosophy Lingnan University, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume94
Issue4
Pages465-485
Publication date2013-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papq.12009
OpenAlexW2146402260
LanguageEN
Citations received72
References cited30

Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse‐grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding to what they ground. The argument proceeds upon two substantive principles: the first is that there is a broadly epistemic constraint on grounding, while the second links this constraint with F ine's A ristotelian notion of essence. Many think grounding is necessary in something like the sense specified above, but just why it's necessary is an issue that hasn't been carefully addressed. If my argument is successful, we now know why grounding is necessary.

Argument (complex analysis) · Character (mathematics) · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Epistemology · Ground · Modal · Physics · Relation (database) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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