Rediscovering Empathy

Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences

Bibliographic Data

ID23396554
AuthorsKarsten R Stueber (0000-0002-5176-4946, corresponding author), Karsten Stueber (0000-0002-2171-0365)
Year2006
Pages288
Publication date2006-09-22
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenueRediscovering Empathy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherThe MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.7551/mitpress/5833.001.0001
OpenAlexW1599669677
Open LibraryOL29594033M
ISBN9780262284530
LanguageEN
Citations received112

Empathy as epistemically central for our folk psychological understanding of other minds; a rehabilitation of the empathy thesis in light of contemporary philosophy of mind. In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents—that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy thesis. Empathy, regarded at the beginning of the twentieth century as the fundamental method of gaining knowledge of other minds, has suffered a century of philosophical neglect. Stueber addresses the plausible philosophical misgivings about empathy that have been responsible for its failure to gain widespread philosophical acceptance. Crucial in this context is his defense of the assumption, very much contested in contemporary philosophy of mind, that the notion of rational agency is at the core of folk psychology. Stueber then discusses the contemporary debate between simulation theorists—who defend various forms of the empathy thesis—and theory theorists. In distinguishing between basic and reenactive empathy, he provides a new interpretive framework for the investigation into our mindreading capacities. Finally, he considers epistemic objections to empathy raised by the philosophy of social science that have been insufficiently discussed in contemporary debates. Empathy theorists, Stueber writes, should be prepared to admit that, although empathy can be regarded as the central default mode for understanding other agents, there are certain limitations in its ability to make sense of other agents; and there are supplemental theoretical strategies available to overcome these limitations. Bradford Books imprint

Agency (philosophy) · Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Empathy · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Simulation theory of empathy · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · Psychological aspects · Science

Tools

Open DOILibgen