The Impact of Military Spending on the Likelihood of Democratic Transition Failure

Testing Two Competing Theories

Bibliographic Data

ID2340754
AuthorsJustin Clardie (0000-0002-2547-7791, Cameron University, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume37
Issue1
Pages163-179
Publication date2011-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueArmed Forces & Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0095-327X • E-ISSN: 1556-0848
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0095327x10372595
OpenAlexW2157732669
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited14

Many countries complete tenuous transitions to democracy and must work to prevent an authoritarian reversal, which is often at the hands of the military. One of the most important tools the new government has in dealing with the military is the amount of money allocated to the military. This leads to the question, how does government military spending in post-transition democratic countries affect the chances of democratic transition failure? The extant literature provides two answers. The first is to increase military spending to placate the military; the second is to decrease military spending to weaken the military and address social welfare needs. The article tests these two hypotheses by examining democratic transitions from 1967 to 1999 using both logit and survival analysis methods. The results of the study provide robust support for the hypothesis that decreasing military spending decreases the likelihood of a democratic transition failure

Affect (linguistics) · Authoritarianism · Democracy · Development economics · Economics · Extant taxon · Government (linguistics) · Government spending · Military government · Military science · Military theory · Military threat · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Welfare · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · International Development and Aid · Law

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub