How to Study Extralegal Groups
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23426122 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christine Cheng (0000-0002-2556-9813, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Publication date | 2018-06-21 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780199673346.003.0002 |
| OpenAlex | W2809396386 |
| ISBN | 9780199673346 |
| Language | EN |
Chapter 1 introduces key concepts for studying and comparing extralegal groups. It begins by differentiating extralegal groups from conceptual cousins such as warlords and mafias—politicized terms which are commonly used as shorthand for “bad guy” or “actors that the UN and the West disapprove of.” The chapter then turns to two ideas for analyzing extralegal groups: conflict capital and time horizons. First, conflict capital helps to explain the stickiness of wartime bonds, the ease with which extralegal groups can form, and the difficulty of dismantling them. After war, these wartime social connections allow for violence to be committed more readily because there already exists a repertoire of violence . Second, incorporating time horizons into statebuilding discussions is key to understanding the incentives of the state, of international actors, and of extralegal groups. The findings from Liberia show that sectors with lower barriers to entry had more extralegal groups.
Ancient history · Capital (architecture) · Computer security · Economics · Epistemology · Incentive · Key (lock) · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Repertoire · Social capital · Sociology · Computer Science · History · Law · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance
| Highly cited | No |
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