Chemical Warfare in Yemen
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23429548 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Asher Orkaby (0000-0001-5865-9439, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Publication date | 2017-06-22 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Beyond the Arab Cold war (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190618445.003.0007 |
| OpenAlex | W4233532847 |
| ISBN | 9780190618445 |
| Language | EN |
Nasser’s “long-breath strategy” from 1966 through the end of 1967 was focused on maintaining the security of the strategic triangle while using fewer troops. Instead, an intensive bombing campaign that included poison gas was used to target the vast royalist cave network in North Yemen. Despite Egypt’s violation of the Geneva Protocols of 1925, the international community failed to condemn the use of chemical weapons, demonstrating the tenacity of the poison gas taboo. Saudi Ambassador Jamil Baroody’s fierce campaign against UN Secretary General U Thant’s inaction failed to persuade the UN to act. The ICRC, NATO, United States, and UK refused to openly criticize Egypt, as they did not want to fall out of favor with Nasser and suffer economic or political repercussions.
Chemical warfare · International community · Political science · Politics · Royalist · Taboo · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |